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Abstract: The evolution of the case law on the principle of non-discrimination (Mangold and Kücükdeveci) 
has shown a clear trend towards its application to litigation between private parties. This contribution 
aims to discuss one of the latest developments in the case law of the Court of Justice, Dansk Industri, and 
its subsequent application by the Danish Supreme Court, the national Court which requested the 
preliminary ruling. The joint analysis of the decisions of the Court of Justice and of the Danish Court 
reveals that this trend towards the horizontal application of the principle of non-discrimination has been 
rejected, and that even fundamental elements of the EU constitutional legal order cannot escape the ultra 
vires review of national Supreme Courts. Will the Court of Justice follow – for the future - the line of the 
defence of horizontal direct effect of the principle, or will it choose a more inclusive solution akin to the 
Taricco II judgement? 
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The direct effect of general principles1 and the ultra vires review2 of some3 of the Supreme and 
Constitutional Courts of the Member States are long-standing issues within European Union law. One 
                                                          
* Peer reviewed. 
1 D. EDWARD, Direct Effect, the Separation of Powers and the Judicial Enforcement of Obligations in Scritti in onore di Giuseppe 
Federico Mancini, Milan, 1998, p. 423. EDITORIAL COMMENT, Horizontal Direct Effect – A law of diminishing coherence?, 
in Common Market Law Review, 1/2006,  p. 1. B. DE WITTE, Direct Effect, Primacy and the Nature of the EU Legal 
Order, in P. CRAIG - G. DE BURCA (eds) The Evolution of EU law, Oxford, 2011, p. 323. P. CABRAL and R. NEVES, 
General Principles of EU law and Horizontal Direct Effect in European Public Law, 3/2011, p. 437. 
2 For a classic example of ultra vires review, see: German Constitutional Court, decision of 6 July 2010, 2 BvR 
2661/06 (the Mangold Urteil), precisely on the compliance of the Mangold decision with the principle of conferred 
powers. E.g. M. PAYANDEH, Constitutional Review of EU Law after Honeywell: Contextualizing the Relationship between the 
German Constitutional Court and the EU Court of Justice, in Common Market Law Review, 2011, p. 9. 
3 Some aspects of the ultra vires review can be understood as opposed to the approach of openness that some 
Constitutional Courts had towards the Court of Justice. On this see G. MARTINICO, Constitutionalism, Resistance, and 
Openness: Comparative Law Reflections on Constitutionalism in Postnational Governance in Yearbook of European Law, 2016, 
p. 318. 
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could accordingly question why Dansk Industri4 and the decision of the Danish Supreme Court5 in which 
the preliminary ruling was requested are worth further reflection. In Dansk Industri the Court of Justice is 
presented with the opportunity to reaffirm the horizontal direct effect of general principles and to clarify 
the theoretical difference between the application of horizontal direct effect and consistent interpretation; 
the Danish Supreme Court opposes a strong refusal, declaring horizontal direct effect of general 
principles as ultra vires. The history of direct effect of provisions of EU law dates back to Van Gend en 
Loos,6 when the Court held for the first time a provision of the Treaties to be enforceable between a State 
and a private party (vertical direct effect) and in Defrenne,7 where the Court found that a provision of the 
Treaties was applicable to litigation between two private parties (horizontal direct effect).8 Later the Court 
extended the application of direct effect to all other EU legal acts (regulations and decisions). Directives 
however represent a specific case, as they are primarily binding on the Member States, who are obliged 
to attain the results which are specified in the legislative act.9 The Court has repeatedly maintained that, 
because of their particular nature, directives are not directly applicable to litigation involving private 
parties,10 leading to interpretative gaps and doubts concerning the consistency of the doctrine of direct 
effect.11 Scholars of European Union law have extensively debated the specific nature of the direct effect 
of directives, and advocated both against and in favour of the full horizontal direct effect of directives.12 
More recently, when the Court has found a legal act (in most cases a directive) to be lacking one of the 
                                                          
4 CJEU, judgement of 19 April 2016, case C-441/14, Dansk Industri (DI). See the comment by E. GUALCO–L. 
LOURENÇO, Clash of Titans –General principles of EU law: balancing and horizontal direct effect, in European Papers, 2016, 
pp. 643-652 and E. GUALCO, La Cour de justice retourne sur l’effet direct du principe de non-discrimination en raison de l’âge: 
(encore) beaucoup de bruit pour rien? in Federalismi.it, 18/2017, although in particular the last article adopts a slightly 
different perspective. 
5 Danish Supreme Court, decision n. 15/2014 of 6 December 2016. 
http://www.supremecourt.dk/supremecourt/nyheder/pressemeddelelser/Documents/Judgment%2015-2014.pdf (Accessed 
January 25, 2018). 
6 CJEU, judgement of 5 February 1963, case 26-62 Van Gend & Loos. 
7  CJEU, judgement of 8 April 1976, case 43-75, Defrenne v Sabena. 
8 The distinction between horizontal and vertical direct effect was first clearly articulated in CJEU, 5 April 1979, 
case 148-78, Ratti. 
9 Art. 288 (3) TFEU.  
10 See e.g. CJEU, judgment of 26 February 1986, case 152-84, Marshall v Southampton; CJEU, judgment of 12 July 
1990, case C‑188/89 Foster and others; CJEU, judgment of 14 July 1994, case C-91/92, Faccini Dori, on which see 
the early critics in doctrine: T. TRIDIMAS, Horizontal effect of directives: a missed opportunity, European Law Review, 
1994, p. 621; E. TURNBULL, The ECJ Rejects Horizontal Direct Effect of Directives, in European Business Law Review,  1994, 
p. 230. More recently see: CJEU, 24 January 2012, case C‑282/10, Dominguez, para 37; CJEU, judgment of 15 
January 2015, case C‑30/14, Ryanair Ltd v PR Aviation BV. 
11 Defined by an authoritative voice as “an infant disease of European Community law”. See P. PESCATORE, The 
Doctrine of Direct Effect: An Infant Disease of Community Law in European Law Review, 8/1983, p. 155. 
12 E.g. P. CRAIG, The Legal Effect of Directives: Policy Rules and Exceptions in European Law Review, 3/2009,  p. 349; A. 
ALBORS-LLORENS, The Direct Effect of Directives: Fresh Controversy or a Storm in a Teacup?, in European Law Review, 
6/2014,  p. 850. 
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conditions triggering direct effect,13 it has decided to apply general principles, and in particular the 
principle of non-discrimination, to litigation between private parties. This is what the Court of Justice 
maintained in Mangold14 and in Kücükdeveci,15 the two main decisions which anticipate Dansk Industri in this 
line of case law. Both decisions have to do with the horizontal direct effect of general principles, albeit 
with some differences.  Whilst in Mangold the Court acknowledged the existence of a general principle of 
non-discrimination, in Kücükdeveci the Court decided to apply the same principle to litigation between 
private parties. Another important decision, Bartsch,16 appeared to change this line of case law, with the 
Court finding the principle of non-discrimination to be inapplicable since the deadline for 
implementation of the directive at national level had not passed; consequently, it was lacking one of the 
conditions for the triggering of direct effect.17 As Kücükdeveci reaffirmed the horizontal direct effect of 
general principles, reducing the impact of Bartsch, it is increasingly difficult to notice a difference between 
the horizontal direct effect of directives and of general principles. In Dansk Industri the Court aims to let 
some light into the foggy room of horizontal direct effect, explaining when the general principle is 
applicable and when, on the contrary, the national Court should interpret the national law consistently 
with EU law.  
 
1. The background of the case and the questions raised by the Danish Supreme Court 
The proceedings in Dansk Industri concern the dismissal of a Danish worker (Mr. Rasmussen) by his 
employer. According to the legislation in force in Denmark,18 dismissed workers are entitled to a 
severance allowance of 1, 2 or 3 months of salary when the working relationship is terminated early, after 
respectively 12, 15 or 18 years. However, the same allowance is not due where the worker has subscribed 
to a pension scheme before the age of 50 and, according to the pension scheme, will receive upon 
dismissal an old-age pension from the employer.19 Having been employed since 1 June 1984, Mr. 
Rasmussen was entitled under Paragraph 2 a (1) to the severance allowance but at the same time, being 
                                                          
13 In order to be directly effective, a provision of a directive should be unconditional and sufficiently precise. Cf. 
CJEU, judgment of 15 April 2008, case C-268/06, Impact  2008 at para 57. 
14 CJEU, judgment of 22 November 2005, case C-144/04, Mangold.. See e.g. the comment by D. SCHIEK, The ECJ 
Decision in Mangold: A Further Twist on Effects of Directives and Constitutional Relevance of Community Equality Legislation in 
Industrial Law Journal, 2006, p. 329. 
15 CJEU, judgment of 19 January 2010, case C-555/07, Kücükdeveci. See the comment of G. DI FEDERICO, Le 
discriminazioni in base all’età nella più recente giurisprudenza della Corte di Giustizia: da Mangold a Georgiev…e oltre in Studi 
sull’integrazione europea, 3/2011, p. 585. 
16 CJEU, judgment of 23 September 2008, case C-427/06, Bartsch. 
17 In order for a directive to be directly effective, the time-limit allowed to the Member State concerned for 
transposing the directive should have passed. See Bartsch (C-427/06) [2008] at [17] and [25]. 
18 Paragraph 2 a (1) of the Law on legal relationships between employers and employees.  
19 Paragraph 2 a (3) of the Law on legal relationships between employers and employees. 
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over 60 years old and benefiting from another pension scheme, under Paragraph 2 a (3) he was not 
entitled to the same allowance. The Court of Justice, however, has already been called upon to interpret 
the provision of Paragraph 2 (a) of the Danish Law, in Ingeniørforeningen i Danmark.20 In this judgment the 
Court of Justice had no difficulty in admitting that the above-mentioned provision was in conflict with 
Directive 2000/78/EC.21 However, that decision involved a dispute between an individual and a public 
administration, whereas Dansk Industri involves a private employer and its employee, a detail which 
excludes the horizontal application of Directive 2000/78/EC. Accordingly, the Danish Supreme Court 
is asking the Court of Justice how to interpret the national legislation, given that pursuant to the doctrine 
on direct effect a directive should not, in principle, produce effects between two private parties.22 This 
does not exclude the application of the general principle of equal treatment, which notably includes the 
principle of non-discrimination on the ground of age. On the other hand, this does not preclude the 
legitimate expectations of the employer, which, in bona fide, relied on the national legislation to avoid 
paying at the same time the pension scheme and the severance allowance.23 Legitimate expectation and 
legal certainty are both general principles of EU law. The question forming the basis of the request for a 
preliminary ruling can be summarised in two points: 1) whether the principle of non-discrimination on 
the ground of age has a broader scope of application than Directive 2000/78/EC itself, to the extent that 
it is applicable to a case involving two private parties; 2) how to balance the principle of non-
discrimination on the ground of age with the principles of legal certainty and legitimate expectations, 
particularly when it is not possible to apply national legislation consistently with EU law. The Danish 
Supreme Court also makes it clear that the employee can seek compensation from the Danish State for 
the incorrect application of EU law.24  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
20 CJEU, judgment of 12 October 2010, case C-499/08, Ingeniørforeningen i Danmark v Region Syddanmark. 
21 Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 Nov. 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment 
and occupation OJ L 303/16. 
22 See P. CRAIG, “The legal effects of directives…” op. cit., p. 376. 
23 It should be noted however that in this case Mr. Rasmussen promptly found another job, thus was not entitled 
to the old-age pension. On legitimate expectation and legal certainty in EU law see P. CRAIG, EU Administrative 
Law, Oxford, 2012, p. 550; E. SHARPSTON, European Community Law and the Doctrine of Legitimate Expectations: How 
Legitimate, and for Whom? in North Western Journal of International Law and Business, 1990-1991, p.87; E. SHARPSTON, 
Legitimate expectations and economic reality in European Law Review, 2/1990, p. 103. 
24 Dansk Industri (DI), cit. para 19. 
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2. The solution proposed by the Advocate General  
According to the understanding of general principles in international law,25 general principles have 
traditionally been labelled as principles of interpretation.26 Within EU law, however, general principles 
have evolved towards something similar to the principles which are enshrined in the national 
Constitutions. This, however, has not occurred without a certain debate within the Court of Justice. It 
can be said that within the Court there is an ongoing confrontation between a more traditional approach, 
which seems to reflect more the doctrine of general principles in international law (the consistent 
interpretation approach)27 and an approach that tends to consider general principles as autonomous 
sources of rights (the constitutional approach).28 While the latter is characterised by the consideration 
that the principle might be applicable ‘as such’,29 the consistent interpretation approach attempts to 
reconcile the interpretation of national legislation with EU legislation, without triggering the general 
principle.  The Opinion of the AG and the judgment of the Court seem to reflect these two approaches. 
Whereas (as it will be seen in the next paragraph) the structure of the judgment of the Court is divided 
into two parts (part I on the scope of application of the principle and part II on the balance), the AG 
attempts to answer a single (albeit quite complex) question: whether and how Paragraph 2 a (3) may be 
interpreted in line with the provisions of Directive 2000/78/EC. The AG centres his analysis on the 
precedent in Ingeniørforeningen i Danmark, where the Court had already declared Paragraph 2 a (3) of the 
Danish law to run counter to Directive 2000/78/EC, thus representing a direct discrimination.30 
However, as it has already been noted, Ingeniørforeningen i Danmark is a case which involved a private and 
a public party, representing a hypothesis of ‘vertical direct effect’. In this case Directive 2000/78/EC was 
held to be applicable, as directives are binding on the States and their internal administration. In contrast, 
the judgment at stake involves the relationship between an employee and its employer, making it a case 
of horizontal direct effect. The Marshall-Dominguez case law, however, clearly states that directives cannot 
represent a source of obligations for individuals, excluding the application of Directive 2000/78/EC to 
                                                          
25 See Art. 38 1 (c) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. 
26 See G. GAJA, General Principles of Law, in R. WOLFRUM (ed), The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, 
Oxford, 2013, http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1410 (Accessed 
January 25, 2018). 
27 Good examples of the use of consistent interpretation within the scope of application of the principle of non-
discrimination are cases CJEU, judgment of 12 December 2013, case C-267/12, Hay and CJEU, judgment of 3 
September 2014, case C-201/13, Deckmyn..  
28 E.g. Mangold (C-144/04) cit.; Kücükdeveci (C-555/07) cit.; CJEU, judgment of 7 March 2014, case C-176/12, 
Association de médiation sociale (AMS) and the present Judgment. 
29 Association de médiation sociale (AMS) (C-176/12) cit. para 47. 
30 Ingeniørforeningen i Danmark (C-499/08) cit. para 49. 
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private parties’ litigation.31 The shifting point of the Opinion of the AG is where he appears to disagree 
with the national Court as to whether it is possible to interpret Paragraph 2 a (3) according to the EU 
secondary legislation.32 The AG agrees that, when it is not possible to interpret national legislation 
according to EU law, then reference should be made to the principle of non-discrimination.33 The point 
at which the paths followed by the AG and by the Court diverge is however the possibility to interpret 
the national legislation according to EU law, making use of the instrument of consistent interpretation, 
also defined as ‘indirect effect’.34 Whereas the Court opts not to concentrate on the possibility to interpret 
the Danish legislation according to EU law, the AG focuses almost exclusively on this point. As 
paragraph 40 of the Opinion states: “The obligation upon national courts to interpret national law in 
conformity with the content and objectives of directives means that directives may have an indirect effect 
in such disputes”. The AG considers that the Court has already emphasised that in similar instances 
precedence should be given to the obligation to interpret national legislation according to EU law35 as 
recourse to the principle in order to resolve inconsistencies between EU and national law should be an 
exception and a last resort36. In this sense the AG opines that the Court should provide guidance to the 
national courts as to the reasons justifying the refusal to use consistent interpretation invoking the fact 
that it could be contra legem.37 In this particular case, the approach of the AG is substantiated by the fact 
that the contra legem interpretation which in the wordings of the national Court is precluding consistent 
interpretation is given by a national case law which interpreted Paragraph 2 a (3) in a way that treated 
those who would actually receive an old-age pension from their employer in the same way as those who 
were merely eligible for such a pension.38 According to the AG, in fact, the literal interpretation of 
Paragraph 2 a (3) does not contradict the Directive, but it needs to be interpreted in a way that it does 
not exclude from the severance allowance those workers who have opted out from the pension benefit 
because they decided to stay on the labour market.39 The AG also held that national case law cannot be 
regarded as a limit to consistent interpretation because it is not equivalent to a “national provision whose 
                                                          
31 Dominguez (C‑282/10) cit. para 37. 
32 Opinion of AG Bot, Dansk Industri (DI) (C-144/14) cit. para 38. 
33 Opinion of AG Bot, Dansk Industri (DI) (C-144/14) cit. para 50. 
34 See S. PRECHAL, Direct Effect, Indirect Effect, Supremacy and the Evolving Constitution of the European Union, in C. 
BARNARD (ed.), The Fundamentals of EU Law Revisited: Assessing the Impact of the Constitutional Debate, Oxford, 2007, 
p. 35. 
35 Opinion of AG Bot, Dansk Industri (DI) (C-144/14) cit. para 47. 
36 Opinion of AG Bot, Dansk Industri (DI) (C-144/14) cit. para 48. 
37 Opinion of AG Bot, Dansk Industri (DI) (C-144/14) cit. paras 53 and 54. 
38 Opinion of AG Bot, Dansk Industri (DI) (C-144/14) cit. paras 27 - 32 - 66. 
39 Opinion of AG Bot, Dansk Industri (DI) (C-144/14) cit. para 65. 
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very wording is irreconcilable with a rule of EU law”.40 If the existence of conflicting national case law 
would be enough to make the interpretation of the national legislation according to EU law contra legem, 
this would be able, according to the AG, to diminish the potential of consistent interpretation in conflicts 
between EU and national law.41 The AG also places an important emphasis on the fact that interpreting 
national law in such a way as to render it consistent with EU law does not place any obligation on 
individuals (going against the Marshall-Dominguez case law) as this obligation was already present within 
the national legislation.42 The AG suggests that the situation does not match the ‘exceptional 
circumstances’ required to trigger the direct effect of the principle of non-discrimination.  
 
3. The Court of Justice and the restatement of the horizontal direct effect of the principle of non 
discrimination on the ground of age 
The argument of the Court is divided into two main parts. In the first part the Court of Justice tackles 
the issue of the scope of application of the principle of non-discrimination against the Directive 
2000/78/EC. The Court departs from the traditional definition of the principle of non-discrimination as 
a general principle of EU law,43 which find its roots in the constitutional traditions common to the 
Member States and finally in the Charter of Fundamental Rights, mentioning the leading case law in 
Mangold and Kücükdeveci. The Court also emphasises that “the scope of the protection conferred by the 
directive does not go beyond that afforded to the principle”,44 which appears to confirm that the 
principles of EU law have a scope of application which is broader than that of the directive. However 
the Court stresses that in order to apply the principle the case should fall within the scope of the 
prohibition of discrimination in Directive 2000/78/EC.45 The Court finds that the case falls within the 
scope of the above-mentioned prohibition as it regards the dismissal of a worker within the meaning of 
Art. 3(1) (c) of Directive 2000/78/EC. As a consequence, the principle of non-discrimination on the 
ground of age should be applied to the dispute, which involves two private persons.46 In the second part 
of its argument, the Court of Justice has been asked by the national Court how to balance the principle 
of non-discrimination, found to be applicable, and the principle of legal certainty and legitimate 
expectations, justified, according to the national court, by the impossibility of interpreting the national 
                                                          
40 Opinion of AG Bot, Dansk Industri (DI) (C-144/14) cit. para 72. 
41 Opinion of AG Bot, Dansk Industri (DI) (C-144/14) cit. para 73. 
42 Opinion of AG Bot, Dansk Industri (DI) (C-144/14) cit. para 76. 
43 Dansk Industri (DI) (C-441/14) cit. para 22. 
44 Dansk Industri (DI) (C-441/14) cit. para 23. 
45 Dansk Industri (DI) (C-441/14) cit. para 25. 
46 Dansk Industri (DI) (C-441/14) cit. para 26. 
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legislation according to EU law.47 The Court accordingly provides the national court with the guidance 
necessary in order to discern between consistent interpretation and the horizontal application of a general 
principle. This is a substantial difference between the reasoning of the Court and the one of the Advocate 
General, which is centred on the attempt to ensure consistent interpretation of the national legislation. 
On the contrary, the Court suggests that it is for the national court to evaluate the conditions under which 
the interpretation of the national legislation can be regarded as contra legem.48 At the same time, however, 
this implies the disapplication of the national provision and the application of the principle of non-
discrimination. 
The judgment tackles two relevant issues which makes it worthy of in-depth analysis. It represents an 
answer from the Court of Justice to some of the criticism which has been put forward either on the 
suitability of the horizontal application of the principle of non-discrimination on the ground of age49 or 
on the theoretical systematisation of the doctrine of direct effect, clarifying the distinctive character of 
horizontal direct effect and of consistent interpretation.50 In both ambits the judgment is to be warmly 
welcomed, as it consolidates and expands the horizontal application of the principle of non-
discrimination and provides a clearer indication of the differences between horizontal direct effect and 
consistent interpretation.51 
a. The scope of application of the principle of non-discrimination and of Directive 2000/78/EC 
The previous case law, in particular Mangold and Kücükdeveci, introduced a new perspective within the 
application of the doctrine of direct effect to general principles and secondary EU legislation. The usual 
understanding of their relationship has been, before these two seminal decisions, that general principles 
were not enjoying a scope of application broader then the legal instrument to which they were linked. As 
to the nature of the legal instrument involved, this has not represented an issue for regulations as well as 
for decisions, in as much as their scope of application is not limited by the Treaties. But, as it is quite trite 
                                                          
47 Dansk Industri (DI) (C-441/14) cit. para 29. 
48 Dansk Industri (DI) (C-441/14) cit. para 43. 
49 Criticism towards the horizontal application of general principles has been developed at different levels. In 
doctrine, see T. PAPADOPOULOS, Criticizing the horizontal direct effect of the EU general principle of equality in European 
Human Rights Law Review, 4/2011, p.437. However, some of the fiercest challengers of the horizontal application 
have been Advocate Generals of the Court of Justice. See, for instance: CJEU, Opinion of AG Ruiz-Jarabo 
Colomer in case C-397/01, Pfeiffer, para 46 and in joined cases C-55/07 and C-56/07, Michaeler et al. para 22; 
Opinion of AG Kokott in case C-321/05, Kofoed v Skatteministeriet , para 67; Opinion of AG Trstenjak in case C-
282/10, Dominguez cit. paras 127 - 128. AG Trstenjak in particular maintains that the horizontal application of 
general principles would be in contrast with the limits towards the application of fundamental rights included in 
Art. 51 (2) of the Charter.  
50 See, for instance, the traditional case law on consistent interpretation, where the principle of legal certainty is 
expressly regarded as a limit towards consistent interpretation. For a relatively recent restatement of this case law, 
see Impact (C-268/06) cit. paras 100 – 101. 
51 See E. GUALCO and L. LOURENÇO, op. cit. p. 643. 
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EU law, directives are binding “only as to the results to be achieved” by the Member States.52 This has 
limited the direct application and enforcement of EU law by the national jurisdictions to decisions 
involving litigation between the State administration and the citizens (vertical direct effect). Again, the 
problem arises when the judgment involves two private parties, as directives may only confer rights upon 
individuals – not generate obligations which are binding upon them. The direct application of the content 
of a directive in front of a national Court would rather lead to the imposition on individuals of obligations 
which should have been dealt with by the State. A similar issue was posed in the past in the notorious 
Defrenne case law,53 were the Court accepted that a Treaty provision (former Art. 118 EEC, now Art. 157 
TFEU), which affirms the principle of equal pay for equal work between men and women, was applicable 
to litigation between private parties. According to Lenaerts, however, it is clear from the reasoning of the 
Court in Defrenne that the source of the direct effect is not the Treaty provision involved but the principle 
of equal treatment, the specific importance of which has conferred direct effect also upon the provision 
of the Treaties.54 The reasoning of the Court in Dansk Industri, accordingly, attempts to reorder the rules 
on the application of the above-mentioned principle to litigation involving private parties. The Court 
undertakes a similar reasoning: it clarifies that the principle of equal treatment finds its roots in various 
international instruments as well as in the constitutional traditions common to the Member States. It also 
mentions the Charter, which is recognised as the shrine of the general principle.55 Up to this point, the 
legal reasoning looks consistent with the earlier reasoning in Mangold and Kücükdeveci. The Court of Justice, 
however, seems to go a few steps further. First, it tackles directly and with a systematic approach the 
issue of the scope of application of the Directive and of the principle, clearly stating that “the scope of 
the protection conferred by the directive does not go beyond that afforded by the principle”.56 It is 
actually the first time that the directive is linked to the principle and not the contrary. In Bartsch, for 
instance, the Court was, on the contrary, linking the scope of application of the principle with that of the 
directive, with the effect that the principle was applicable on the condition that the Directive itself was 
applicable.57 In this decision, on the contrary, the Court appears to define the principle while putting it 
into relationship with the Directive. The Court, however, to apply the principle refers to the “scope of 
                                                          
52 Art. 288 (3) TFEU. 
53 Defrenne v Sabena (II) (43/75) cit. 
54 K. LENAERTS, The Principle of Equal Treatment and the European Court of Justice in Il Diritto dell’Unione Europea, 2013, 
p. 461 in part. p. 470. K. LENAERTS and J. GUTIERREZ FONS, The Constitutional Allocation of Powers and General 
Principles in EU law in Common Market Law Review, 2010, p. 1629 in part. p. 1648. 
55 Dansk Industri (DI) (C-441/14) cit. para 22. 
56 Dansk Industri (DI) (C-441/14) cit. para 23 
57 In Bartsch the Court found that there was no “link” between the facts of the case and EU law, as the term for 
implementation of the Directive 2000/78/EC was not yet expired for Germany: see Bartsch (C-427/06) cit. para 
21. See also K. LENAERTS and J. GUTIERREZ FONS, op. cit. p. 1643. 
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the prohibition of discrimination” granted by the Directive, which is a definition broader than that in the 
previous case law, which seems to define the principle in relationship with the Directive.58 As a 
consequence, the principle of non-discrimination can be applied if the situation falls within “the scope 
of the prohibition of non-discrimination” of the Directive. However, it can be maintained that “the scope 
of the prohibition” is wider than the “scope of application” of the Directive, otherwise we should assume 
that in this case the Directive itself would be applicable, contrary to the doctrine of direct effect.59  The 
Court of Justice here perhaps refers to the scope of the Directive “ratione materiae”, as the decision is about 
the dismissal of a worker pursuant to Article 3(1)(c) of Directive 2000/78/EC.60 This reasoning however 
seems to represent a step further, as it consolidates the case law in Mangold and Kücükdeveci, but appears 
to progressively detach the principle from the Directive.  The Court then moves towards the apex of its 
reasoning, where it openly recognises that the principle of non-discrimination holds a specific, distinctive 
place within the constitutional legal order of the EU. At paragraph 26 of the judgment, the Court 
maintains that, given that the applicability of Directive 2000/78/EC to the Danish legislation in force 
has already been found in previous case law, the same “applies with regards to the fundamental principle 
of equality, the general principle prohibiting discrimination on grounds of age being a merely specific 
expression of that principle”.61 It is worthy to note that Lenaerts theorised a similar approach, which 
envisages the fundamental role of the principle of non-discrimination within the EU constitutional order, 
pointing out that “general principles of EU law enjoy a ‘constitutional status’”.62 The doctrine is not 
unanimous on this assumption, as other authoritative voices have raised different views in the past.63 This 
cannot however undermine the potential of the innovation that the Court is supporting by opening to 
the use of general principles (and in particular of the principle of non-discrimination) when EU secondary 
legislation is not applicable. 
b. Towards a clearer theoretical systematisation of the difference between horizontal direct effect and consistent interpretation? 
One relevant objection that advocates of the horizontal direct effect of general principles face when 
arguing in its favour is that the effet utile of the directive can be equally ensured through the consistent 
                                                          
58 Dansk Industri (DI) (C-441/14) cit. para 24: “in order for it to be possible for the general principle prohibiting 
discrimination on grounds of age to be applicable to a situation such as that before the referring court, that situation 
must also fall within the scope of the prohibition of discrimination laid down by Directive 2000/78”. 
59 Dansk Industri (DI) (C-441/14) cit. para 25. 
60 The Court uses the expression: “The national legislation at issue falls within the scope of EU law and, 
accordingly, within the scope of the general principle prohibiting discrimination on the ground of age”. Dansk 
Industri (DI) (C-441/14) cit. para 25. 
61 Dansk Industri (DI) (C-441/14) cit. para 26. 
62 K. LENAERTS, op. cit., p. 470. K. LENAERTS and J. GUTIERREZ-FONS, op. cit. p. 1647. 
63 See, inter alia, V. SKOURIS, Effet utile Versus Legal Certainty: The Case-law of the Court of justice on the Direct Effect of 
Directives in European Business Law Review, 2006, p. 241, in part. p. 254. 
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interpretation of the national legislation.64 Consequently, as AG Bot maintained in his Opinion, principles 
should be applied only if there is no other way to interpret national legislation consistently with the 
Directive.65 In Dansk Industri, however, the Court of Justice seems to suggest a clearer definition of the 
difference between direct effect and consistent interpretation and, most importantly, appears to enlarge 
the number of cases in which the principle can be used, representing another exception to the doctrine 
of consistent interpretation.66 In this case the Court of Justice affirms that the principle of non-
discrimination can be balanced and can prevail over the competing principles of legal certainty and 
legitimate expectations.67 
The second question posed by the national Court can be partitioned in two different parts. The first part 
pertains to the possibility to interpret contra legem national legislation when this interpretation can conflict 
with the interpretation of a national court. In this part of its reasoning the Court of Justice gives a clear 
indication to the national Court as to the approach to be taken when a settled national jurisprudence is 
openly in conflict with EU law. For the Court of Justice, while there is an extensive case law on the limits 
of consistent interpretation,68 the national Courts are under an obligation to change their established case 
law should it enter into conflict with EU law.69 This consideration can be regarded as an obvious corollary 
of the principle of primacy of EU law over national law, but it also pertains, importantly, to the 
relationship between EU law and national Courts and, ultimately, the role of national judges as the very 
last interpreters of EU law.70 Logically, the impossibility of interpreting national legislation in compliance 
with EU law because of the existence of conflicting national case law implies, for the Court, the 
disapplication of the conflicting national provision.71 The Court of Justice appears to justify this move 
on the ground of the sui generis status of the principle of non-discrimination, which, in AMS, was openly 
recognised as a justiciable general principle.72 The Court of Justice went on to say that “the principle 
prohibiting the discrimination on the ground of age, confers on private persons an individual right which 
                                                          
64 E.g. T. PAPADOPOULOS, op. cit.; M. DE MOL, Kücükdeveci: Mangold Revisited - Horizontal Direct Effect of a General 
Principle of EU Law in European Constitutional Law Review, 2010, p. 293 in part. p. 302.  
65 Opinion of the AG Bot in Dansk Industri (DI) (C-441/14) cit. para 64. 
66 See P. CRAIG, “The Legal Effect of Directives…”, op. cit. p. 357. 
67 See, for instance, C. BARNARD and S. PEERS (eds), European Union Law, Oxford, 2014, p. 157. 
68 See in particular: Impact, (C-268/06) [2008], Dominguez (C‑282/10) [2012], Association de médiation sociale (AMS) 
(C-176/12) [2014]. 
69 Dansk Industri (DI) (C-441/14) cit. para 33. 
70 Dansk Industri (DI) (C-441/14) cit. para 34. 
71 Dansk Industri (DI) (C-441/14) cit. para 35.  
72 Association de médiation sociale (AMS) (C-176/12) cit. para 47. 
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they may invoke as such”.73 In AMS, in fact, the Court reads Kücükdeveci74 in a very extensive way, raising 
the point of the independent application of the principle of non-discrimination and, departing from its 
reasoning in the first part of the decision and in the previous case law, holds that the principle can be 
invoked “as such”75, suggesting that only a very limited link with EU law might be necessary to trigger its 
application. This consideration also raised the question of the “preferential treatment” which is accorded 
to the general principle of non-discrimination (more specifically, on the grounds of age). From the same 
judgment we also know that this condition is not necessarily shared by other principles embodied in EU 
legislation as well as in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Apparently, the Court of Justice justifies 
the horizontal application of the principle of non-discrimination by reference to its “fundamental” nature, 
as this principle is clearly the source from which most of the rights and principles embodied in the 
Treaties draw their source. This is another confirmation of the fact that the principle of non-
discrimination, as Lenaerts has consistently held, is to be regarded as a constitutional principle of EU 
law.76  
In the last part of its judgment, the Court solves the remaining two requests put forward by the Danish 
Supreme Court. First, the balance between the competing principles: on one side, the principle of non-
discrimination, and on the other side, the principles of legitimate expectations and legal certainty. The 
Danish Supreme Court relies on the fact that these two principles are equally general principles of EU 
law, which should have the same value, in abstracto, as the principle of non-discrimination. Accordingly, 
it is asking the Court of Justice how to solve this apparent conflict. The Court of Justice, however, gives 
a predominantly procedural answer, refraining from going in depth into the analysis of the conflict of the 
two principles. The argument of the Court is based on the fact that the application of the principle of 
legal certainty would limit the temporal application of the Directive to situations which have taken place 
after the judgment.77 The Court seems to avoid recognising a conflict between the two principles, limiting 
itself to considering the practical outcome should the legitimate expectations of the employer prevail.  
Second, the Court explains why the justiciability of the principle of non-discrimination is necessary, it 
not being a sufficient guarantee for those who have had their rights violated to be able to pursue damages 
in front of a national or European Court.78 This substantiates the thesis that the principle of non-
                                                          
73 Dansk Industri (DI) (C-441/14) cit. para 36. 
74 In Association de médiation sociale (AMS) (C-176/12) the Court does not quote a specific Paragraph of the judgment 
in Kücükdeveci, but makes reference to the decision as a whole.  
75 Association de médiation sociale (AMS) (C-176/12) cit. para 47. 
76 K. LENAERTS and J. GUTIERREZ-FONS, op. cit., p. 1647. See also G. Martinico, op. cit., p. 335. 
77 Dansk Industri (DI) (C-441/14) cit. para 40. 
78 Dansk Industri (DI) (C-441/14) cit. para 42: “[I]t should be noted that the fact that it is possible for private persons 
with an individual right deriving from EU law, such as, in the present case, employees, to claim compensation […] 
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discrimination holds a special place within the general principles, as the Court in AMS has already 
maintained that not all the principles which are embodied in primary EU legislation can be enforced in 
front of a Court.79   
 
4. The non-application of the judgment of the Court of Justice by the Danish Supreme Court 
The solution given by the Court of Justice in Dansk Industri represents an important systematisation of 
the case law on the principle of non-discrimination. Notwithstanding that, the Danish Supreme Court 
decided not to follow the indication provided for by the Court and decided not to apply the principle of 
non-discrimination. The Danish Supreme Court maintained that it was not possible to interpret Danish 
law in conformity with EU law, otherwise, as anticipated in its question for preliminary ruling, this would 
have been regarded as a contra legem interpretation.80 The main reason for refusing the application of the 
preliminary ruling as resulting from the reasoning of the Danish Court can be summarised as follows: the 
principle of conferral does not allow the Court of Justice to claim the power to apply the principle of 
non-discrimination to a litigation between private parties.81 In particular, the Danish Court says that the 
Danish Accession Agreement to the European Union of 1973 (as well as the Preparatory Works of the 
Danish Parliament) does not contain any legal basis to confer upon an unwritten EU principle the right 
to prevail over a provision of national law.82 This restrictive and literal interpretation of the principle of 
conferred powers is not surprising as this is not the first case in which a national Supreme or 
Constitutional Court refuses to follow the indications received by the Court of Justice.83 However, the 
argument used seems not to take into account the fact that the reasoning of the Court of Justice on 
primacy and direct effect is based on unwritten principles. Should it accordingly be assumed that this 
                                                          
cannot alter the obligation the national court is under to uphold the interpretation of national law that is consistent 
with Directive 2000/78 or, if such an interpretation is not possible, to disapply the national provision that is at 
odds with the general principle prohibiting discrimination on ground of age”. 
79 Association de médiation sociale (AMS) (C-176/12) cit. para 45: “It is therefore clear from the wording of Article 27 
of the Charter that, for this article to be fully effective, it must be given more specific expression in European 
Union or national law”. 
80 It is worthy to note that the Advocate General was convinced of the opposite. See the Opinion of AG Bot in 
Dansk Industri (DI) (C-144/14) cit. paras 63 - 64. 
81 S. KLINGE, Dialogue or disobedience between the European Court of Justice and the Danish Constitutional Court? The Danish 
Supreme Court challenges the Mangold-principle in EU Law Analysis, 13 December 2016, 
http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.it/2016/12/dialogue-or-disobedience-between.html (Accessed January 25, 2018). 
82 Danish Supreme Court, decision of 6 December 2016, n. 15/2014 p. 40, 
http://www.supremecourt.dk/supremecourt/nyheder/pressemeddelelser/Documents/Judgment%2015-2014.pdf (Accessed 
January 25, 2018). 
83 See CJEU, 22 June 2011, case C-399/09, Marie Landtová. On this point see generally O. POLLICINO The New 
Relationship between National and the European Courts after the Enlargement of Europe: Towards a Unitary Theory of 
Jurisprudential Supranational Law? in Yearbook of European Law, 2010, p. 65. 
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decision of the Danish Supreme Court is a challenge to the primacy of EU law over national law? Perhaps 
the real meaning of the judgment is that the Danish Court wants the Court of Justice to withdraw from 
its Kücükdeveci and Mangold case law and to go back to its Dominguez decision.84 In that judgment the Court 
openly recognised that it is for the national Court to decide if it is possible to apply national law in 
conformity with EU law, without imposing the horizontal application of the principle of non-
discrimination.85 The Dominguez decision represents however a step back in the process of 
constitutionalization of EU law through general principles which the Court has strongly upheld in the 
recent past, and which is clearly reflected by the approach taken in Dansk Industri. The refusal of the 
Danish Supreme Court to follow the preliminary ruling of the Court of Justice in Dansk Industri is not 
however sufficient to reduce the impact and the importance of its decision. The authority of the decisions 
of the Court of Justice does not depend simply on their implementation at national level. Other national 
Courts can equally apply the judgment and at the same time other private parties can rely on the principle 
of non-discrimination in front of national Courts, provided that it is not possible to interpret national 
legislation according to EU law.  
 
5. Conclusion 
Despite the refusal of the Danish Supreme Court, the road towards the “fundamental” role of general 
principles appears better paved after this judgment.86 There are however two (final) considerations that 
the decision raises and that the Court of Justice will have to address in the future. The first is the 
differentiation that the Court of Justice is operating between the different grounds of protection afforded 
by the principle of non-discrimination.87 The analysis of the present judgment strongly reaffirms, six years 
after Kücükdeveci, that the principle of non-discrimination on the grounds of age can be triggered in front 
of national Courts and between private parties. The principle of non-discrimination on the grounds of 
age is however one of six grounds of discrimination protected by the Treaties,88 and one of fifteen 
grounds of discrimination included in the Charter.89 It is accordingly not misplaced to wonder whether 
the same approach is to be applied with all the different grounds of discrimination, or if it is restricted to 
                                                          
84 CJEU, 24 January 2012, case C‑282/10, Dominguez. 
85 Dominguez, cit., para 44. 
86 L.S. ROSSI, How Fundamental are Fundamental Principles? Primacy and Fundamental Rights after Lisbon in Yearbook of 
European Law, 2008, p. 65. 
87 Noted also by T. PAPADOPOULOS, op. cit. p. 446.  
88 Art. 18 and 19 TFEU protect the discrimination on the grounds of nationality, racial or ethnic origin, religion or 
belief, disability, age or sexual orientation. 
89 Art. 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU protects a wider range of grounds of discrimination: 
nationality, sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any 
other opinion, membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation. 
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certain grounds. However, as Lenaerts suggests, the “constitutional status” of general principles means 
that whether a general principle produces direct effect is a matter to be established by the Court of 
Justice.90 This analysis is inevitably carried out on a case-by-case basis. We should not however be 
surprised by the fact that in this way the Court of Justice appears to introduce a difference in treatment 
between the protected grounds, as this is intrinsic to the relational character of the equality principle.91 
The second consideration contextualises the open ultra vires declaration by the Danish Supreme Court in 
the overall relationship between the Court of Justice and national Constitutional and Supreme Courts. 
The ultra vires review and the identity review92 operated by the Constitutional and Supreme Courts of the 
Member States represent a challenge for the Court of Justice. The case law of the Court of Justice on 
national constitutional identities shows that the Court has accepted that the principle of equal treatment 
and its corollaries (the fundamental freedoms) can be limited by the rights that are embodied in national 
constitutions.93 The national Courts, on the contrary, have not as yet shown a similar openness towards 
fundamental elements of EU law, or, at least, they are showing an increasing diffidence.94 This fact can 
bring about important shortcomings, also in light of the consideration that the Court of Justice seems to 
increasingly regard the principle of non-discrimination on the ground of age as a distinctive character of 
the EU constitutional legal order, up to the point that it could be added to an hypothetical and de jure 
condendo EU constitutional identity.95 In Dansk Industri the Court of Justice reminds its national 
counterparts of the importance of the principle of non-discrimination to the EU constitutional legal 
order, and the Danish Supreme Court refuses its application. Will this lead to a stronger defence of the 
                                                          
90 K. LENAERTS, op. cit. at p. 469. 
91 One of the first comprehensive books about the principle of non-discrimination elaborates an analysis of this 
character of the equality principle which remains still actual. See M. BENEDETTELLI, Il giudizio di eguaglianza 
nell’ordinamento giuridico delle Comunità Europee, Milan, 1989, p. 18. 
92 German Constitutional Court, order of 8 December 2015, 1 BvR 99/11. 
93The latest example has been the so called second Taricco decision,  CJEU, 5 December 2017, case C-42/17, 
M.A.S. and M.E.B. CJEU, 22 December 2010, case C-208/09, Sayn-Wittgenstein, CJEU, 2 June 2016, case C-438/14, 
Bogendorff von Wolffersdorff . 
94 See, i.e. Italian Constitutional Court, judgment of 14 December 2017, n. 269/2017. In this decision, the Italian 
Constitutional Court, in an obiter dictum, appeared to restrict the possibility for national judges to disapply, although 
in very specific circumstances, national norms conflicting with EU law, ordering instead to upheld a preliminary 
ruling to the Court of Justice. On this point see the comments of L.S. ROSSI, La sentenza 269/2017 della Corte 
costituzionale italiana: obiter 'creativi' (o distruttivi?) sul ruolo dei giudici italiani di fronte al diritto dell'Unione europea in 
federalismi.it, 3/2018 and F. S. MARINI, I diritti europei e il rapportotra le Corti: le novità della sentenza n. 269del 2017, in 
federalismi.it, 4/2018. 
95E.g. F.X. MILLET, L'Union européenne et l'identité constitutionnelle des États membres, Paris, 2013; L.S. ROSSI, Fundamental 
Values, Principles and Rights After the Treaty of Lisbon: The Long Journey Towards a European Constituional Identity, in AA . 
VV. Europe(s), Droit(s) européen(s), Liber Amicorum en l’honneur du Professeur Vlad Constantinesco, Brussels, 2015, p. 511 ; 
L. BOURGOGNE-LARSEN (eds), L’identité constitutionnelle saisie par les juges en Europe, Paris, 2011. See also the 
considerations made in the Opinion of AG Wathelet in Bogendorff von Wolffersdorff , cit. paras 92 - 108. 
  
17        federalismi.it - ISSN 1826-3534                        |n. 9/2018 
 
 
 
  
principle of non-discrimination by the Court of Justice or, in the future, will the Court of Justice follow 
a more inclusive (although criticised)96 style alike to the one in the MAS and MEB(Taricco II)97 decision?  
                                                          
96See e.g. D. BURCHARDT, Belittling the Primacy of EU Law in Taricco II in Verfassungblog, 7 December 2017, 
https://verfassungsblog.de/belittling-the-primacy-of-eu-law-in-taricco-ii/ (acceded 25 January 2018). 
97 M.A.S. and M.E.B (C-42/17), cit. 
